published in: Journal of Public Economics, 005, 89 (2-3), 487-500.
In 1990 Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance payments with a new system
of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Although severance payments often are
justified on the grounds that they provide insurance against earnings loss, they also increase
costs for employers and distort employment decisions. The impact of severance payments
depends largely on how much of the costs to employers can be shifted to workers. The
theoretical analysis in this paper shows that, in contrast to a traditional system of severance
payments, the system of SPSAs facilitates the shifting of severance payments costs to
workers in the form of lower wages. Empirical results using the Colombian National
Household Surveys indicate that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of the total
severance payments contributions to wages and had a positive effect on weekly hours.
Results using the 1997 Colombian Living Standards Measurement Survey suggest that,
although SPSAs in part replaced employer insurance with self-insurance, SPSAs continue to
play a consumption smoothing role for the non-employed.
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