published in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27, 571-594
Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and
axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence
on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We
examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation
behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the
normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe
actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the
proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation
agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.
We use cookies to provide you with an optimal website experience. This includes cookies that are necessary for the operation of the site as well as cookies that are only used for anonymous statistical purposes, for comfort settings or to display personalized content. You can decide for yourself which categories you want to allow. Please note that based on your settings, you may not be able to use all of the site's functions.
Cookie settings
These necessary cookies are required to activate the core functionality of the website. An opt-out from these technologies is not available.
In order to further improve our offer and our website, we collect anonymous data for statistics and analyses. With the help of these cookies we can, for example, determine the number of visitors and the effect of certain pages on our website and optimize our content.