The paper explores the role of workers’ expectations as an original explanation for the
puzzling long run persistence of observed discrimination against some minorities in the labor
market. A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identical groups
of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their different
beliefs, even though discriminatory tastes and statistical discrimination by employers have
disappeared. Wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in this
circumstance, being the ultimate cause of a lower percentage of promotions which supports
these wrong beliefs.
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