published in: European Economic Review, 2009, 53 (8), 937-951
This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions.
The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once
they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a
benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the
ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefit sanctions
stimulate the outflow from unemployment.
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