published in:B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Advances in Theoretical Economics , 2006, 6 (1), 1265-1265
We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitive
shortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomes
increasingly ‘blurred’ as the events are pushed further in time. We axiomatise a class of
preference representations which can be specialised to rationalise ‘anomalies’ such as
preference reversals and cyclical preferences. We also present an application to a form of
time inconsistency which we dub ‘the now or never fallacy’.
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