published in: Public Choice, 2007, 132 (3-4), 257-271
We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to
enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which
fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that,
under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.
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