published in: European Economic Review, 2003, 47(4), 645-668
We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths,
training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until
1995 (”Pre-Bosman” or P), currently in use (”Bosman” or B), and recently approved (”Monti”
or M) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club must accept in case of a transfer
depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different
systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the
expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system.
Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare.
Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system
B.
We use cookies to provide you with an optimal website experience. This includes cookies that are necessary for the operation of the site as well as cookies that are only used for anonymous statistical purposes, for comfort settings or to display personalized content. You can decide for yourself which categories you want to allow. Please note that based on your settings, you may not be able to use all of the site's functions.
Cookie settings
These necessary cookies are required to activate the core functionality of the website. An opt-out from these technologies is not available.
In order to further improve our offer and our website, we collect anonymous data for statistics and analyses. With the help of these cookies we can, for example, determine the number of visitors and the effect of certain pages on our website and optimize our content.